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loss as a consequence of having children against the worth of chil-
dren to the woman and society. We would see to it that women get 
what most women want-time enough to nurture their children ad-
equately without being punished later by an unforgiving job market. 
Children make losers of women only because our society devalues 
childraising. 
Surely we can have no peace until we admit that children need 
us all, with our varied talents and skills, some probably gender 
based, some socially shaped, but all important. We can never 
reacknowledge this simple truth until we break free from radical 
feminism's repressive ideology that would deny us a free exchange 
of ideas. We must make up our own minds, live our lives in support 
of one another instead of at war, care for our children as we see fit, 
free from an ideological burden that impoverishes us all. We must 
learn to reconnect if our society is to survive. 
FORTAS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME 
COURT JUSTICE. By Bruce Allen Murphy.1 New York: 
William Morrow. 1988. Pp. 717. $25.00. 
John C Chalberg2 
This is an overly long book about the public life of a Supreme 
Court Justice and his unplanned, undesired, and very brief judicial 
career. Justice Fortas served on the Court for a mere four years. 
Hounded by Lyndon Johnson to fill the vacancy created by the 
strange resignation of Arthur Goldberg, this "lawyer's lawyer's 
lawyer" reluctantly agreed to leave his lucrative Washington prac-
tice rather than disappoint his friend and client, the president. Har-
ried by congressional conservatives, Fortas reluctantly resigned 
from the Court in 1969 rather than face certain impeachment at the 
hands of his enemies in Congress. In between there was the aborted 
nomination of Fortas to Chief Justice in the waning months of the 
Johnson presidency. 
All this and more has been chronicled by Professor Bruce Al-
len Murphy, whose previous book was a study of the non-judicial, 
perhaps even injudicious, activities of Louis Brandeis and Felix 
Frankfurter. 
Like the work on Brandeis and Frankfurter, this is biography 
I. Professor of Political Science, Penn State University. 
2. Professor of History, Normandale Community College, Bloomington, Minnesota. 
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as investigative reporting. If Murphy is right, he has found many 
"smoking guns," any one of which, had it been publicized at the 
time, would have been sufficient to assure that Fortas's tenure on 
the Court wold have been even briefer than it was. 
In brief, Professor Murphy doesn't much care for Abe Fortas. 
In fact, of the three subjects of his investigative eye Murphy has the 
least sympathy for Fortas. Like Frankfurter, Fortas enjoyed power 
and prominence during the New Deal. Unlike Frankfurter, Fortas 
was a Yale man, whos5 patron was fellow Yale professor William 
0. Douglas. Harvard, academically and socially, was simply not to 
his liking. It was Yale, not Harvard, which took a functional ap-
proach to the law; and right from the start an ambitious Abe Fortas 
wanted to understand how law actually operated in the real world. 
In addition, as a southerner (Memphis) and a Jew, Fortas thought 
he already had two strikes against him. The intolerance he detected 
in and about Cambridge threatened strike three. New Haven might 
not be ideal for the impoverished Fortas, but he thought it offered a 
more tolerant atmosphere in the classroom and out. Nothing he 
learned subsequently changed his mind. 
Murphy spends little time tracing Fortas's early legal career. 
With Douglas's intercession he signed on with the AAA before fol-
lowing Douglas to the Securities and Exchange Commission. There 
were also stints of teaching at Yale and a wartime tour of duty with 
Harold Ickes and the Interior Department before Fortas settled in 
for what he expected would be a lifetime of work and pleasure as 
the ultimate Washington lawyer. 
In Murphy's view there were two kinds of New Dealers after 
World War II: those who wanted an expansion of the New Deal for 
the sake of the nation and those who wanted a new deal for them-
selves. Fortas, the "legal gunslinger," falls easily into the latter 
category. 
At this point problems-for Murphy-arise. Just who was 
Abe Fortas? Was he the preeminent wheeler-dealer, the last and 
best hired gun? Or was he the archetypal Cold War liberal? 
"Both," seems to be Murphy's answer. On the one hand, he con-
tends that Fortas's failure to be elevated to Chief Justice sent the 
Court in a conservative direction, thereby changing American his-
tory "forever." In his concluding "political autopsy of Abe Fortas" 
Murphy compares the Fortas debacle to the Senate's 1987 rejection 
of the nomination of Robert Bark. In 1968 the liberals lost; 
nineteen years later they won. Therefore, Bark's was "not the first 
modern nomination rejected for ideological reasons." That dubious 
distinction, according to Murphy, belongs to Fortas. 
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This thesis strikes me as an oversimplification. In the first 
place, Murphy himself concedes that the "Fortas-Thornberry 
ticket" (Texas judge Homer Thornberry was the President's choice 
for the Fortas seat), would have probably shifted the court "more 
toward the middle." This is hardly a ringing endorsement for a 
Fortas-led Court as the embodiment of postwar liberalism. One 
doubts that there would have been all that much difference between 
a Fortas Court and a Burger Court. 
Second, the interpretive thrust of this biography is to portray 
Fortas as anything but an ideologue. His friendship with Lyndon 
Johnson, which dated from Fortas's years at Interior, was based on 
their common approach to politics. Both were "problem-solvers." 
Neither "really had a philosophy." True, Johnson was everything 
Fortas was not. He was large of stature and of political ambition. 
He loved the public dimension of public life as Fortas did not. For-
tas, on the other hand, was an intellectual and, ironically, one of "at 
least the same caliber as LBJ's enemies among the Harvards." So 
the two men did complement one another, but they also shared an 
aversion to ideological thinking in general and to doctrinaire liber-
als in panicular. 
Fortas, of course, did have a past. His pro bono work in de-
fense of Owen Lattimore had long made him an object of the wrath 
of conservative anti-communists. But Murphy is quick to absolve 
Fortas of any personal links to the Communist party. Unable to 
find a shred of evidence that Fortas "even flirted" with the commu-
nist movement, he is convinced that his subject was not even aware 
of the existence of a CP cell within the AAA. 
Murphy does find Fortas's defense of Lattimore to be com-
mendable, but he notes that Fortas took few such cases and snidely 
suggests that he did so in this instance to "soothe his conscience." 
As a Washington Lawyer, Fortas had taken on a number of major 
business clients, thereby committing a form of "corporate treason" 
against his old New Deal agencies. It is ironic, then, that Fortas 
would subsequently be attacked by the Right in its McCarthyite 
campaign against "twenty years of (New Deal-style) treason." 
That Fortas was persona non grata to conservatives does not 
mean that he was a liberal's liberal. What he was above all was 
Lyndon Johnson's personal friend, prized adviser, favored hand-
holder, and ultimate yes-man. In some respects this is less a biogra-
phy of Abe Fortas than a study of the "monogamous relationship" 
between these two very powerful men and the ruin of a professional 
career that resulted from that relationship. 
Out of his friendship with Fortas, Johnson was determined to 
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place (Murphy's verb is "force") Fortas on the Court. The problem 
was the absence of a vacancy, but in Lyndon Johnson's world every 
problem had a solution. And the solution to this particular di-
lemma was provided by none other than John Kenneth Galbraith. 
Rumor had it that Galbraith was slated to become the Ambassador 
to the United Nations (following the sudden death of Adlai Steven-
son). Not at all anxious to assume that post, Galbraith suggested to 
Johnson that Justice Arthur Goldberg would be an admirable sub-
stitute. Thus was set in motion a chain of events which culminated 
in Abe Fortas becoming a Justice. 
How did Johnson engineer all this? The first step was surpris-
ingly easy. Goldberg, who was as anxious to remain on the Court 
as Fortas was to remain off it, was led to believe that he would be 
given a major role in foreign policy-making and then a return en-
gagement on the Court. The second step proved to be more diffi-
cult. Fortas genuinely did not want what LBJ wanted for him. 
After repeated rejections of his entreaties Johnson's ultimate ploy 
was to make an unfavorable comparison between Fortas's recalci-
trance and the willingness of American boys to serve and die in 
Vietnam. Nevertheless, to his dying day Abe Fortas was convinced 
that he had "never said yes" to his would-be benefactor. 
Between his appointment and his death in 1982 Fortas would 
spend four years "dying on the Court." Those four years comprise 
the heart of this book. More specifically, the focus is on the single 
year between Johnson's attempt to perform one more favor for his 
friend and Fortas's resignation in disgrace. 
Once on the bench, Fortas was quite willing to succeed Earl 
Warren as Chief Justice. After that possibility had been scotched, 
he was willing to fight to retain the seat he had never wanted in the 
first place. 
Such is the stuff of tragedy. Fortas did not want to surrender 
his access to the White House. Nor did he relish the prospect of a 
drastic cut in pay. Simply put, money was "too important" (Mur-
phy's phrase) to him. Lastly, he doubted that he had the "philo-
sophical assurance" (his own phrase) necessary for the bench. 
Despite these strong misgivings, Fortas permitted himself to be 
manipulated onto the Court. And, once there, he discovered that 
he did not necessarily have to surrender either power or money. 
Murphy spends precious little time dissecting Fortas's judicial 
opinions. In brief, his thinking epitomized what is sometimes called 
"corporate liberalism." In civil liberties cases he invariably sided 
with the individual against the state. In antitrust cases he generally 
ruled for the business firm and against the government. In this re-
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spect, Murphy concludes, Fortas differed from Goldberg, who usu-
ally supported the liberal position on both individual rights and 
regulation of business. 
While not a liberal's liberal, Abe Fortas did establish himself as 
a member in generally good standing of the Warren Court. Differ-
ing with Justice Black, Fortas took the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment to mean that it was the Court's obligation to 
expand constitutional rights in the name of protecting minorities. 
Staking out a leadership role for himself, he argued strenuously for 
the rights of juveniles in criminal proceedings. 
In the now famous Brandenburg case Fortas voted with the 
majority in striking down an Ohio criminal syndicalism law which 
had been used to punish "mere advocacy" of ideas-even if advo-
cacy in this instance meant one Clarence Brandenburg's role in the 
burning of a wooden cross at a KKK rally. But when it came to the 
burning of an American flag Fortas indicated that there were limits 
to his willingness to protect "mere advocacy." Voting with the mi-
nority, Fortas refused to overturn a conviction for flag mutilation 
(in response to the shooting of James Meredith). To Fortas, this 
was not free speech, but an "act of desecration" which had to be 
judged by the standard governing "conduct" rather than speech. 
This dissent notwithstanding, Fortas in a few years on the 
Court had clearly established a reputation as a liberal on personal 
freedom issues. But just as clearly, he was neither a doctrinaire lib-
eral nor, dare it be said, an out of the mainstream liberal on such 
issues. After examining a series of obscenity cases (which provided 
senate conservatives with some of the rope used to hang Fortas in 
1968) Murphy concludes that Fortas was somewhere in the middle 
of the Court. 
In his only signed opinion on the subject of obscenity, Fortas 
revealed the "equivocal nature" of his thinking on this issue. The 
case was Ginsberg v. New York. One Samuel Ginsberg, owner of a 
combination stationery store and luncheonette, was convicted of 
selling two "girlie" magazines to a sixteen-year-old boy, who was 
acting on the instructions of his mother. Dissenting from the 
Court's affirmation of the conviction, Fortas argued that there was 
no criminal intent since Ginsberg had not "pandered" to the boy. 
Ironically, that same "pandering" formula would subsequently be 
used to convict people for aggressively selling otherwise legal mater-
ials. Therefore, in convincing his colleagues to focus on the conduct 
of the seller rather than the material itself, Fortas actually helped to 
make convictions in this area somewhat easier. In any event, even 
though he was always fearful of a new wave of book-burning, For-
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tas was far from the protector of obscenity that his conservative 
opponents in the senate would soon make him out to be. 
Unlike his mentor, William 0. Douglas, Fortas was not a first 
amendment absolutist. This was made especially apparent in a 1967 
case involving a conflict between press freedom and privacy rights. 
Time v. Hill concerned a Life magazine story on the connection 
between an actual hostage-taking incident and a fictionalized ac-
count of that same event. The hostage Hill family subsequently 
sued to recover damages for the invasion of their privacy. To For-
tas that privacy was vastly more important than any free press 
claim. In his view, "Needless, heedless wanton injury" had been 
inflicted on the Hills in an attempt to sell magazines at the expense 
of their peace of mind. Fortas's opinion was the majority opinion 
until Justice Black decided to swing into action. In the end, that 
majority disappeared down a Black hole. "First amendment free-
doms," Black argued, cannot be "weighed by judges against a 
judge-made right of privacy." Flushed with anger, Fortas issued his 
dissent "with more heat than usual"-a performance that Murphy 
attributes to Fortas's strong "hatred of the press." 
Richard Nixon was the lawyer for the losing side in Time v. 
Hill. This footnote to the case would figure somewhat prominently 
in Fortas's confirmation proceedings. Those proceedings and the 
maneuverings that took place before and during, as well as in and 
out of hearing rooms and various Washington offices, comprise vir-
tually half of the book. Again, Murphy has written not so much a 
biography of Fortas as a behind the scenes civic lesson on how 
Washington really works. 
The result is a fascinating, if bumpy, read. Fearing that his 
ancient enemy, Richard Nixon, would be in a position to appoint 
his successor, Earl Warren resigned in June of 1968. But when he 
resigned he did so secretly and conditionally (in that it was to take 
effect upon the confirmation of his successor). Immediately White 
House wheels were set in motion-secretly. This was Lyndon 
Johnson's Court, and he was determined that his loyal friend would 
lead it even as he contemplated his own retirement. This meant 
cultivating senate "whales" like Richard Russell and Everett Dirk-
sen. While all of this stroking and dealing was being done, news of 
Warren's pending retirement leaked. The result was a premature 
"Pickett's charge" led by Lyndon Johnson, master politician, but 
without all of his soldiers neatly in line. In this instance, however, 
defeat was not a foregone conclusion. As Murphy tells the story, 
this was a fight that not only swayed back and forth, but one that 
Johnson and Fortas might well have won. 
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It was also a fight that Murphy deeply believes that Johnson 
and Fortas did not deserve to win. In a desperate move to secure 
their victory Fortas himself rushed into the breach. Despite White 
House misgivings, he decided to testify in his own behalf. Never 
before had a sitting member of the Court submitted to senate ques-
tioning on the subject of his own nomination for Chief Justice. It 
proved to be a fatal, if almost unavoidable, blunder, not in the sense 
of dooming immediately his historic appointment, but in the sense 
of dooming irrevocably his historical reputation. 
Here irony outweighs tragedy. Fortas was defeated for a 
number of reasons. His was a lame duck appointment (though 
there were precedents for such nominations). He was too liberal for 
many senators (though not the impassioned liberal many conserva-
tives thought him to be). He was Jewish (though it was Fortas him-
self who was shameless in raising the largely phony charge of anti-
Semitism). He was victimized by the anti-obscenity lobby (though 
unfairly so), thereby giving a number of fence-sitting senators a 
handy justification for refusing to vote cloture (thereby, no doubt, 
preventing confirmation by the barest of majorities). He was dam-
aged by his connections (though his full association with the likes of 
the convicted Louis Wolfson would not be revealed until his final 
fight and ultimate defeat in 1969). And he was a Lyndon Johnson 
crony (though the full extent of his role in the Johnson administra-
tion would not be known until this book). 
On more than one occasion Murphy broadly hints that, had 
the senate only known of Fortas's continuing role as an adviser to 
the President, he would easily have been defeated. In point of fact, 
they didn't and he wasn't. In short, the Senate acted properly, but 
for the wrong reasons. 
Here tragedy replaces irony. Abe Fortas was a brilliant and 
successful Washington lawyer, who loved the Washington life, rel-
ished Washington power and treasured his access to the Johnson 
White House. Murphy goes to considerable lengths to chronicle 
Justice Fortas's extra-judicial activities on behalf of his "only cli-
ent." Who initiated the contact? An almost immediately bored 
Abe Fortas. Within days of his accession to the bench he was offer-
ing his services to the president. Within the year he was making 
almost no effort to hide his relationship with Johnson. 
During the remainder of the Johnson administration Fortas 
was involved in everything from speech-writing to crisis manage-
ment (in the face of urban riots) to counseling the president to stay 
the course in Vietnam. It was as though nothing had changed. The 
president was still his client. It was as though nothing was wrong. 
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Nobody seemed to worry about compromising what the president 
considered to be his Court or what the Justice regarded as his part-
time judicial career. It was just business as usual. And it all went 
well beyond anything Brandeis or Frankfurter did. 
It was as if Fortas could not help himself-once he had taken 
his first plunge. After all, his president, yes his nation, needed him. 
Ironically, while on the Court he played a much greater role in for-
eign policymaking than did Arthur Goldberg as UN Ambassador. 
Unfortunately, foreign policy was not Fortas's forte. His actual role 
was little more than that of yes-man and cheerleader at a time when 
President Johnson would have been better served by hard thinking 
and hard talking about a tragically mistaken war. 
Of course, Johnson needed loyal friends. Of course, presidents 
must be protected. When all was said and done that really was For-
tas's task: protect the president at all costs. Appearances were 
everything. Whether sending marines into the Dominican Repub-
lic, dispatching troops to Detroit, or dropping bombs on Indochina, 
protect your client. 
Appearances continued to be everything when it came time for 
Chief Justice-designate Fortas to testify before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee regarding the White House activities of Mr. Justice For-
tas. Yes, there had been meetings with the President. To Murphy, 
this in itself was a significant admission: "Never before had a 
Supreme Court Justice willingly admitted in such a forum that he 
had knowingly violated the sacred myth of separate governmental 
powers .... " But what exactly had Fortas admitted? He had been 
"honored" to be invited to participate in a "few critical meetings." 
Beyond that Fortas would not go. Murphy concludes that the "true 
story" of the Justice's more than few meetings would have "shocked 
even Fortas's allies." But then truth to this Washington lawyer was 
"secondary when there was a battle to be won." 
This battle, of course, was lost, but it was not lost for lack of 
effort. For someone who had been not at all anxious to join the 
Justices in the first place, Fortas fought very hard to become their 
chief. In fact, resorting to "outright lies" was not beyond him once 
he realized that the Judiciary Committee did not have the evidence 
to support the charges concerning services rendered to his most im-
portant "client." 
This battle and the one which followed a year later are charac-
terized by Murphy as a "holy war" between l~berals and conserva-
tives over the course of the nation's future. Murphy's comparison 
of the failed confirmations of Abe Fortas and Robert Bork is clinch-
ing evidence of his contention that some sort of titanic ideological 
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struggle unfolded in the summer of 1968. Yes, Abe Fortas was 
some sort of liberal. But he was defeated not simply because he was 
a liberal (does anyone doubt that a Philip Hart would have been 
confirmed at that time?), but because he truly did lack "judicial 
temperament." And no one knew this better than Fortas himself. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK AND HIS CRITICS. By Tinsley E. 
Yarbrough.! Durham, North Carolina: Duke University 
Press. 1989. Pp. xii, 323. Cloth, $45.00. 
James Magee2 
Justice Hugo Black was Franklin Roosevelt's first appointee to 
the Supreme Court. His tenure coincided with the transformation 
of the judicial agenda from one preoccupied with property rights to 
the modern predominance of civil rights and liberties. Beyond 
doubt, he played a major role in fashioning the triumphs of the 
Warren Court, and by any measure he was one of the most influen-
tial jurists in our constitutional history. 
The Nine Old Men were often assailed for protecting property 
interests in the guise of enforcing the Constitution. Senator Black, 
elected in 1926 and serving in the Senate until his appointment to 
the Court, was one of the most relentless of the Court's critics, and 
he knew very well that more than text, first principles, or original 
intent produced the judicial dogmas that were erected to invalidate 
progressive legislation. 
As a Justice, Black in turn was criticized and even ridiculed 
when he insisted that the many novel judicial results that he 
reached in protecting civil rights and liberties were derived merely 
from fidelity to the law. 
Black drew critics from across the spectrum: conservatives 
who challenged his liberalism as lawless; liberals disappointed that 
their erstwhile hero appeared to forsake the cause amidst the social 
turmoil of the 1960s; and legal scholars, some of whom found his 
jurisprudence simplistic. Alexander Bickel dismissed Black's juris-
prudence as a fake, concluding that reliance on textualism was-as 
had been true of his disingenuous predecessors-a smokescreen to 
foster political convictions.3 Black's "achievement," he observed, 
I. Professor of Political Science, East Carolina University. 
2. Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Delaware. 
3. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 84-113 (1962). 
